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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 15743

VINCENT L. BELGARD,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Vincent L. Belgard appeals from
a conviction of automobile homicide in the Third Judicial
Court, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Vincent L. Belgard, was charged
with automobile homicide, a felony in the third degree, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1953) as amended.
Appellant was also charged with failure to stop
at the scene of an injury accident, a class A misdemeanor,
in violation of § 41-6-31 of the Utah Code Annotated.
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On November 17, 1977 the appellant was convicted
by a jury on both counts; and received sentences of

o-

5

years for automobile homicide, and one year for failure
to stop at the scene of an injury accident.

Both sentences

are to run concurrently.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions
and judgments rendered in the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately 1:20 p.m. on July 28, 1977
several people witnessed the appellant, who was driving
his automobile south on 700 east, run a red light at the
intersection of 700 east and 3300 south and strike Michael
Winn (who later died from injuries suffered) as he began
to cross the intersection on foot.

After striking the

victim, the appellant continued southbound without stopping
(T. 89 Vol. II)

( T. 5 Vol. III)

(T. 25 Vol. III).

Three

witnesses pursued the appellant in their vehicles to a
point where he turned off 700 east and came to a stop at
a residence about 635 east 3835 south (T.107 Vol. II).
One of the witnesses made a citizen's arrest (T.125 Vol DI
(T.11 Vol. III)

(T. 31 Vol. III) and another called the
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police (T.12 Vol. III).

The witnesses remained with the

appellant until the police arrived, except for a "few seconds"
(T.99 Vol.II, T.13 Vol.III) when he stepped inside the
house to get a wash cloth to wipe blood from his nose and
mouth.

The witnesses testified that appellant's breath

smelled of alcohol (T.101 Vol.II, T.13, 32 Vol. III) and
also that.his difficulty in walking and his slurred speech
gave them the impression he was drunk.

(T.98 Vol. II)

About fifteen minutes later, Trooper Lynn Thompson arrived
at the scene.

He also testified that appellant appeared

drunk due to his speech, diffulty in walking and the odor
of alcohol on his breath (T.49, 50 Vol.III).

However,

because appellant had suffered some injuries he was not
given a field sobriety test (T.32 Vol.l).

For appellant's

own safety, and to provide him with medical assistance,
Trooper Thompson took him into custody and drove him to
St. Marks Hospital (T.59 Vol.III).

The officer advised

appellant of the terms of Utah's implied consent law and
§

76-5-207 of the Utah Code, and requested that he submit

to a blood test (T. 49, 50 Vol. 1).

Initially appellant

objected to the test as a violation of "God's Law",(T.50
Vol. 1), but by the time arrangements for taking the blood
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sample had been completed, the appellant voluntarily
walked into the room, laid down on the gurney and extended his arm to have a blood sample drawn.

(T.48 Vol.l),

the sample was drawn by Ms. Kay Fowler, a registered nurse
employed by the City-County Health Department to draw
blood for the police department (T.69 Vol.III).

The blood

sample was analyzed by Mr. Lynn Davis, a chemist for the
City-County Health Department, (T.79 Vol.III), who determined the blood alcohol content to be .28%.

(T.90 Vol.III).

Trooper Clark Bowles later testified that given the facts
in evidence, the blood alcohol level of appellant could
not have been less than .08% at the time of the accident.
(T.14

Vol.III).
On August 1, 1977, before any complaints were

filed

(M.8) appellant was arraigned and plead guilty in

the justice court before Judge Charles Jones on five counts
1) driving under the influence, 2) improper registration,
3)

fraudulent registration 4) no driver's license, and

5) no inspection (M.6-8).

On August 3, 1977, Judge Jones

vacated the plea of guilty, and appellant subsequently was
tried in district court on the counts of automobile homicid<
and failure to stop at the scene of an injury accident
(R.25) appellant was convicted on both counts

(R. 97,98).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A.
APPELLANT'S BLOOD
SAMPLE WAS NOT OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF HIS RELIGIOUS SCRUPLES, AND CONSEQUENTLY THE ADMISSION OF
THE PESULTS OF THE BLOOD
_11.LCOHOL ANALYSIS WAS NOT
A VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
Appellant argues that the admission by the
trial court of the results of the blood test was a
violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights because the
blood sample was drawn after he purportedly objected to
the extraction of his blood on religious grounds.
The facts reflect that after Officer Lynn
Thompson told aopellant that a blood test was going to
be taken, aopellant merely stated "it is against God's
law" and "I don't want it".

No elaboration was made bv

appellant as to what he meant.
Later,

(T. 47, 50, 53; Vol. I)

when final preparations were made for the

te~t

nt the

hospital, appellant freely and of his own accord walked
into the room where the blood was to be drawn, laid down
on the gurney, and extended his arm so that the blood could
be taken.

Ms. Kav Fowler, a registered nurse, nroceeded to

draw the blood in normal fashion without encountering any
resistance from

ap~ellant.

(T. 48 Vol. 1).
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•

No evidence was offered at trial to show that appellant
belonged to any type of a religious organization or adhered to a personal religious dogma, a basic tenet of
which forbade submitting to a blood sample.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757

(1966),

established the general rule that blood samples can be
taken from arrested individuals without their consent
so long as the Police officer has probable cause to
believe that the defendant has been driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, and the blood
sample is taken in a proper medical environment by qualified medical personnel. Under such circumstances, there
is no violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Appellant contena

however, that the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber,
~,

also carved out an exception to the above general

rule at 384 U.S. 771 of its decision wherein the Court
stated:
Petitioner is not one of the
few who on grounds of fear, concern
for health, or religious scruple
might oref er some other means of
testing, such as the "breathalyzer"
test petitioner refused, seen. 9,
supra:
We need not decide whether
such wishes would have to be respected.
Appellant therefore claims he falls within this alleged
exception.
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At the outset, it is clear that the Court did
not expressly establish a religious scruple exception to
it's own decision in Schmerber.

Rather, the Court

explicitly refused to decide whether any such exception
would be recognized.

Thus, appellant's statement at p. 9

of his brief is inaccurate where he states:
. . • since the blood samole
in this case was obtained aaainst his
wishes and in violation of his religious scruples, this case falls within the exception imolicity [sic] recognized by the United States Suoreme
Court in Schmerber.
·
Similarly, appellant's characterization of the above
passage in Schmerber at p. 10 of his brief is also inaccurate and misleading where he says:
"Under the reasoning of Schmerber,
supra, where a person refuses to consent
~blood test on religious grounds,
a result oooosite to that reached in
Schmerber
appropriate."

1;

In short, the United States Supreme Court refused to decide
whether an objection to a blood test on religious grounds
would make any difference.

Indeed, appellant has failed

to cite any case authority which has held that an extraction
of blood over an arrested person's protests on religious
grounds would violate the Fourth A.Tttendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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---

Although respondent was unable to locate
caselaw directly on point within the context of the
instant case, there is substantial caselaw determining
when claims based on religious beliefs should be upheld,and
when First Amendment protection has been denied to alleged
religions or religious tenets that are shams designed
to exploit the constitution, and which are devoid of religious sincerity.

In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,

215 - 216 (1972), the United States Supreme Court had to
determine the legality of refusals by the Old Order Amish
to send their children to school after the eighth grade.
The Court stated:
Although a determination of
what is a 'religious' belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate
question, the very concept of ordered
liberty precludes allowing every
person to make his own standards on
matters of conduct in which society
as a whole has important interests.
The courts have therefore developed certain criteria in
determining the validity of religious claims including
the history and age of the sect, Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra,
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319

(1972); whether the asserted

religion has the characteristics associated with traditioo~
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"recognized" religion, Remers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537
(N.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd 494 F.2d 1277

(8th Cir. 1974),

Cert. denied 419 U.S. 1012 (1974), Fulwood v. Clemmer, 406
F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); and the sincerity of the
belief of the religious sect, or the individual.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333
F. 2d 1182

(1970), Hemes v. McNulty, 432

(9th Cir. 1970), Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390

(5th cir. 1974).
In United States v. Seeger, the United States
Supreme Court considered whether several conscientious
objectors had established the validity of their religious
objections to induction into the Armed Forces.
holding that the petitioners

The court,

qualified for conscientious

objector status, stated that in order for a person to
establish the validity of an

all~ged

religious belief,if

he is not a member of certain recognized exempt religious
organizations, he must demonstrate "a sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption. .

" Seeger, at 176.

"While the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question,
there remains the significant question ~hether it is
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'truly held'.

This is the threshold question of sincerity

which must be resolved in every case.
a questio·n of fact.

.

It is, of course,

Seeger, at 18 5.

The court also

stated it is the duty of the court "to decide whether the
beliefs professed by [Petitioners]

are sincerely

held and whether they are, in [their own scheme of
things, religious."

Seeger, at 185.

Two years later, the District of Columbia Distric:
Court in United States v. Kuch, 288 F Supp. 439

(D.D.C. 1%:

held that a woman who professed to be a member of a church
which used Marijuana and LSD as its sacraments failed to
demonstrate the sincerity of her religious beliefs.

Con-

sequently her motion to dismiss charges of unlawful obtaini:
and transferring marijuana, and unlawful sale, delivery and
possession of LSD, was denied.

Regarding her claim that

handling the contraband was pursuant to a religious belief,
the court stated:
What is lacking in the proofs
received as to the Neo-American Church
is any solid evidence of a belief in
a supreme being, a religious discipline,
a ritual, or tenets to guide one's
daily existence.
In short, she has totally failed
in her burden to establish her alleged
religious beliefs, an essential premise
to any serious consideration of her motion
to dismiss.
Kuch, at 438, 439.
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In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970),
another conscientious objector case, the Supreme court
made it clear that a belief must not only be sincere, but
must be a constant and ongoing dogma.

The Court stated

that a conscientious objector must hold "deeply and sincerely . . . beliefs that . . . impose upon him a duty of
conscience to ref rain f rorn participating in any war at
any time.

Welsh at 340 (emphasis added).
Applying the above law to the facts in the

instant case, it is clear that appellant failed to show
at trial either that he belonged to an organized sect which
had as a tenet of its beliefs the abhorrence of all
blood extractions, or that he personally held such a
"sincere and meaningful belief" which occupied in his life
a place parallel to the God of an established sect.

The

fact that he merely told Officer Thompson that the blood
test was against "God's Law", without elaborating as to
why it was against God's Law, or what basic tenet of his
religion it violated implies the shallowness of his alleged
religious belief.

Also, the fact of his eventual

submission to the blood test without resistance (T. 48 Vol.I)
further shows the lack of sincerity of his purported beliefs.
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Similarly, appellant failed to show his alleged belief,
that a blood extraction violated "God's Law", was a
constant ongoing religious tenet.

He did not comply witl

Welsh, supra, by showing that he was opposed to submitting
to any blood sample at

~

time, and not just a sample

that would tend to incriminate him.

Indeed, the record

evidences that he served in the Armed Forces, where
blood tests are a requirement of entry, and was wounded
in Vietnam, suggesting that he previously had submitted
to blood tests.

(T. 100 Vol.II)

In summary, the appellant failed in his burden
to establish the validity and sincerity of his religious
beliefs.

Moreover, because the exception suggested by

appellant has not been recognized by any court, the general
rule of Schmerber, ~, should be the controlling law
governing the blood test in this case.

As articulated ~

Schmerber, the relevant questions are whether the intrus~
is "justified in the circumstances," and "whether the mean:
and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness."
Schmerber, at 768.
A review of the facts reveal that Officer ThOrnpso:
decision to take a blood sample was justified and reasonabli
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under the circumstances.

A field sobriety test was

inappropriate, as appellant was visibly injured and
could have caused additional injury.

Moreover, such a

test might have reflected the injury to the appellant's
head and the shock of having been involved in a serious
accident rather than his state of inebriation.

Also, as

recognized by the Supreme Court in Schmerber, "Extraction
of blood samples for testing is a highly effective means
of determining the degree to which a person is under the
influence of alcohol.
at 436 n.3."

See Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.,

Schmerber, at 771.

In an effort to be

fair to the appellant, as well as to use a highly reliable
method, Officer Thompson elected to have a blood sample
taken.

The reasonableness of taking of the sample was

enhanced further by the fact that the appellant had to
be taken to the hospital anyway for treatment of injuries
he sustained in the accident, and Schmerber requires that
blood samples be drawn in a 'Medical Environment'.

Also,

the appellant's objection that he believed it was
"against God's Law" to submit to a blood sa'llple was not
sufficient to put Trooper Thompson on notice of any
significant religious objection--nor did appellant request
an alternative form of chemical analysis.
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Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.lO{a)
(1953), as amended, states:
No person, who has been requested
pursuant to this section to submit to a
chemical test or tests of his breath,
blood, or urine, shall have the right
to select the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of
a peace officer to arrange for any
specific test shall not be a defense to
taking a test requested by a peace
officer nor be a defense in any criminal,
civil or administrative proceeding
resulting from a person's refusal to
submit to the requested test or tests.
The Code states unequivocally that the police
officer, not the arrested driver, is to determine which
chemical test to use, and the failure of the officer to use
any particular test is not a defense.

In the instant case,

Trooper Thompson determined that a blood test was most
appropriate under the circumstances.

In light of the

reasons set forth above, administering a blood test was
reasonable under the circumstances, and the actions of
Trooper Thompson conform to both the spirit and letter
of the rule established in Schmerber.
Finally, respondent submits that contrary to
appellant's characterization of the facts, the transcript
reflects that appellant consented to the blood test.
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In Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218 (1973),
the United States Supreme Court held that where a defendant consents to a search, the search is valid and does .
not violate the Fourth Amendment, and all evidence seized
pursuant to the search is admissible.

The question of

whether consent was given is to be determined under the
totality of the circumstances.
412 U.S. 218

Schneckloth v. Bustamente,

(1973), People v. Renfrow, 172 Colo. 399,

473 P.2d 957 (1970).

The fact that a defendant was

under arrest, or even in handcuffs, does not per se mean
that consent to a search was not voluntary and freely
given.
266

People v. Rodriguez, 168 C.A. 2d 452, 336 P.2d

(1959), People v. James, 19 Cal. 3d 99, 137 Cal. Rptr.

447, 561 P.2d 1135 (1977).

In State v. Yoss, 146 Mont.

508, 409 P.2d 452 (1965), neither the fact that the
defendent was under arrest, nor that he was warned that
a search warrant would be obtained if he refused to consent
to the search was enough to make the consent per se
coerced, and the consent was held to be both voluntary and
competent.

No words need to be spoken at all for a person

to consent to a search, and under appropriate circumstances,
consent may be manifest by a gesture alone.

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-15OCR, may contain errors.

People v. James, 19 Cal. 3d. 99, 137 Cal. Rptr. 447,
561 P.2d 1135 (1977). See also State v. Radford 30 Or.
App. 807, 568 P. 2d

69 2 ( 1977) .

The degree of affirmative

assistance given to the police by the defendant is
relevant in determining whether the defendant consents
to the search.
P. 2d

State v. Knaubert, 27 Ariz. App. 53, 550

1045 (1976).
In the instant case, Officer Thompson read and

explained to appellant Utah's Implied Consent Law,§ 41-6·4\
which states that a person's driver's license will be
revoked if he does not consent to a chemical test, and
Utah's Automobile Homicide Law,§ 76-5-207 which provides
that in the case of an automobile accident resulting in
serious injuries to another person, a policeman with
probable cause may compel the driver to submit to a blood
test.

(T. 47 Vol. 1).
Since the accident in question involved serious

injuries to Michael Winn, which later resulted in his
death, Officer Thompson correctly explained to appellant
that if he did not consent to the blood test, the test
would be taken by force if necessary.

The appellant refuse

stating "it is against God's Law," and "I don't want it"
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(T. 47,50,53 Vol.I), but when the final preparations
were made for the test, the appellant freely and of his
own accord walked into the room where the blood was to
be drawn, laid down on the gurney and extended his arm
to Ms. Kay Fowler who was to draw the blood.

Ms. Fowler

proceeded to draw the blood in her normal fashion without
encountering any difficulty or requiring any assistance.
Although appellant knew that if he did not
consent, a blood sample would be drawn anyway, because
Trooper Thompson merely explained the relevant State law
and did not threaten any illegal action, no coercion was
involved.

Under the rules explained in People v. James,

supra, and State v. Knaubert, supra, consent may be
unmistakenly manifest by action alone without any words
being spoken.

The facts that appellant willingly walked

into the room, laid down on the gurney and extended his
arm to facilitate the blood extraction indicate that he
freely and voluntarily consented to the blood sample.
Appellant's actions in failing to resist the
blood extraction also fall within the holding of this court
in State v. VanDam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976).

The

petitioner in that case was charged with rape.

The
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prosecution took hair samples from him to use as

eviden~

Petitioner stated he would not resist the taking of the
hair samples, but made clear that they were taken over
his objections.

On appeal, Petitioner asserted the

taking of the hair samples over his objections constitute
an "unreasonable search" and violated the Fourth Arnendrnen
This court held that the search was not compulsory; that
even though the appellant objected, his Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated because he offered no resistance
Defendant urges that the hair
taking (after arrest and while in
custody, when defendant volunteered
that he wouldn't resist but would
object) violated his Utah and
federal constitutional rights under
the Utah section and Fourth and Fifth
federal Amendments . . .
As to state and federal constitutional provisions mentioned; defendant was not compelled to give
a) evidence, b) or be a witness
against himself.
The officers relieved him of the hair (without any
resistance) . Under such circumstances
the cases say no constitutional
rights are violated. {Emphasis added.)

Applying the reasoning of VanDam to the instant
case, although appellant objected to the blood test, because he did not "resist" the extraction of the blood
sample, he was not "compelled" to give evidence, and

consequently his Fourth Amendment rights were not violatec

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
'·,
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-18-errors.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain

In Summary, Respondent asserts that appellant
failed to establish at trial the validity of his "religious
scruples" objection to the blood test; that Schmerber,
supra, did not explicitly or implicitly recognize a
religious exception; that the taking of the blood sample
was reasonable under the circumstances as required by
Schmerberi and that appellant, in fact, consented to the
blood extraction.

Consequently appellant's Fourth

Amendment rights were not violated, and the blood test
results were properly admitted into evidence.
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•

B.
APPELLANT WAS NOT COMPELLED BY THE THREATENED USE
OF FORCE [TO PERMIT THE BLOOD
SAMPLE TO BE TAKEN] IN VIOLATION OF HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS UNDER ROCHIN.
Appellant contends that his Fourth Amendment
privacy rights were violated when Trooper Thompson told
him· that if he did not voluntarily submit to a blood
test, the test would be compulsorily administered.

In

support of this argument appellant cites Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Respondent submits this argument is without
merit for several reasons:
First, Rochin, supra, is distinguishable from
the instant case, and appellant's attempt to extend its
holding to this case stretches it far beyond it's appropriate parameters.

Rochin, supra, involved an incident

where the police,after receiving information that

appella~

was selling narcotics, walked into appellant's apartment
through his open door.
on his bed.

The police

Appellant was sitting half-dress~
saw

two suspicious looking

capsules on the night stand, but as they approached
appellant grabbed the capsules and placed them in his
mouth.

The officers jumped on appellant and tried to
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extract the capsules from his mouth, but he had already
swallowed them.

The police then handcuffed the appellant

and took him to the hospital to have his "stomach pumped.."
In his vomit, the police found two capsules containing
morphine that were used as evidence in his conviction.
In response to this form of police misconduct, the court
stated:
We are compelled to conclude
that the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness
or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This
is conduct that shocks the conscience.
Illegally breaking into the privacy
of the petitioner, the struggle to
open his mouth and remove what was
there, the forcible extraction of
his stomach's contents~this course
of proceeding by agents of government
to obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities. They
are methods too close to the rack and
the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation.
342 U.S. at 172 (1952)
In Rochin, the brutal violation of the integrity
of the appellants' person offends one's sense of decency,
and is a shocking denial of due process and the Fourth
Amendment right of privacy.
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However, the Court nowhere licensed the
extension of the holding to cases where violation of
privacy rights were merely threatened.

The case purported

to protect only actual and blatant violations of one's
privacy rights over his person, and appellant has cited
no authority substantiating his suggested extension.

In

fact, the court took pains to limit the applicability of
the decision stating:
In deciding this case we do not
needlessly bring into question decisions in many states dealing with
essentially different, even if related
problems.
Rochin, at 174 (1952).
In the instant case, Officer Thompson did not
engage in any behavior that even remotely resembles the
facts of Rochin.

Here, there was no phy$ical violence,

and no forcible intrusion violating the integrity of the
appellant's person.

Consequently, the Fourth Amendment

privacy violations Rochin was designed to protect are
conspicuously absent in this case.
In the alternative, assuming (without admitti~I
that Rochin does extend to cases involving mere "threats
of violence," the police actions must still constitute
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"conduct which shocks the conscience."

Appellant argues

that Trooper Thompson engaged in "indiscriminate threats
of violence" and "psychological intimidation," and that
this "shocks the conscience" and satisfies the test.
This claim, however, is not supported by the record.
Trooper Thompson merely advised appellant of the Utah
statutory· law governing the situation.
that 1)

He told him

if he did not consent, his driver's license would

be revoked pursuant to Section 41-6-44; and 2) because
the accident victim was seriously injured, if the appellant
did not submit voluntarily, the blood sample could be
compulsorily extracted pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-207.
In advising the appellant of the relevant Utah
law, he was only fulfilling his duty.

The tenor of these

remarks do not ring of "violence" or "brutality."

Rather,

their tone is one of urging the appellant to submit to
the blood test so that force would not be necessary.
Certainly, Trooper Thompson's actions were not conduct
which "shocks the conscience."

Indeed, Trooper Thompson

should be commended for his patience and restraint, and
civility in encouraging appellant to submit voluntarily,
rather than forcibly extracting the blood sample, as
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207.
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Finally, since Rochin was decided in 1952, it
has been limited in scope and application by subsequent
decisions.

In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (19661

a blood sample was compulsorily extracted over the objections of the appellant.

He challenged the 'trial court's

admission of the blood sample as a violation of his privacy
and due process rights under Rochin.

The United States

Supreme Court held that compelling a person to give a bloo<l
sample did not violate his privacy and due process rights
when the blood sample was drawn in a hospital by qualified
medical personnel (as was done in the instant case).

See

also Briethaupt v. Abram; Warden, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
In the instant case the blood test was administered in
St. Mark's Hospital

(T. 43 Vol. I) by Ms. Kay Fowler, who

was authorized by the City and County Health Department
to draw blood samples for the police (T. 4 7, 60 Vol. I).
Since Schmerber, supra, held that under certain
circumstances a person's blood could forcibly be withdrawn,
it follows that merely "threatening" to take blood, under
the circumstances authorized in Schmerber, supra, does not
violate one's privacy or due process rights.
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c.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 765-207 (1953), AS AMENDED,
IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OVERBROAD; FUTHERMORE APPELLANT LACKS STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE
ON THE BASIS OF OVERBREADTH.
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-207(2), (1953), as

amended, states:
The presumption established by
section 41-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor
Vechicle Act, relating to blood
alcohol percentages, shall be applicable to this section and any chemical
test administered on a defendant with
his consent or after his arrest under
this section, whether with or against
his consent, shall be admissible in
accordance with the rules of evidence.
Appellant argues that the statutory language
allowing the results of any chemical test administered
with or without a defendant's consent to be admissible
subject only to the rules of evidence is unconstitutionally
overbroad and violative of the principles set forth in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966).
At the outset, it should be noted that appellant's
claim of overbreadth was not raised at trial, and is being
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raised for the first time on appeal.

Therefore, the iss~:

not timely preserved for appeal and should accordingly be d.
missed.

Se~

First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State

University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975); David v. Mulholla~,
25 Utah 2d. 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970); and State v. Tritt,
23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970).
Secondly, respondent submits that appellant
lacks standing to attack the constitutionality of the
statute on overbreadth grounds.

The United States Supreme

Court has repeatedly held that:
One to whom application
of a statute is constitutional will
not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it
might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations
in which its application might be
unconstitutional.
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17

(1960) .

1

Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 123;
Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar
Co., 226 U.S. 217; Collins v. State of Texas, 223 U.S.
288, 295-296; People of State of New York ex rel.
Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160, 161; Cf. Voeller
v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 537;
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,
513; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S.
515,558; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442;
Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U.S. 50, 54-55;
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 576; Tyler v.
Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405;
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
347-348.
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This same rule has also consistently been invoked
by the Utah Supreme Court.

In State v. Tritt, 23 Utah

2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970), a case involving a conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
petitioner claimed that the statute describing the
offense was unconstitutionally vague.

The Utah Supreme

Court held the statute valid and stated:
It is a generally held rule that
even if a statute may be unconstitutional as applied to certain individuals or situations it will not be
stricken down at the behest of one
who is not adversely affected by
the defect.
Id. at P. 809.
See also State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (Utah 1975),
Justice Hall's concurring opinion in Salt Lake City vs.
Piepenburg, 571 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Utah 1977), State v.
Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944), and State
ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49 P.2d 408
(1935).
Appellant's first contention appears to be that
Section 76-5-207 is unconstitutionally overbroad because it does not carefully specify under what conditions
the chemical tests may be administered.

However, re-

gardless of the specificity of the phrase of the statute
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in question, in the instant case all of the requirement:
of Schmerber and Rochin, suora, were fully and carefully complied with.

The record indicates that the

blood sample was drawn after appellant's arrest based
on probable cause that he was intoxicated, and was
administered in St. Mark's Hospital by a registered
nurse authorized to draw blood samples for the police.
The principles of Rochin, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), were
also complied with in the present case (see Point I-B).
Consequently, because appellant's constitutional rights
were not

11

adversely affected 11 by the alleged consti-

tutional defect of the statute, he lacks requisite
standing to attack its validity on the assumption that
it might violate the constitutional rights of others
if applied to them under different circumstances.
The second ground for appellant's claim of
overbreadth is that the statute allows in evidence of
a chemical test result "regardless of who the test is
administered to."

Appellant's brief at p. 13.

This

claim assumes that appellant is part of a constitutional:
protected class of defendants who, because of their
status in the class, need not allow blood samples to
be extracted.

(e.g. those who object to blood extractio:
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because of certain religious scruples.)

Respondent, has

already shown in Point IA, supra, that appellant does not
fit in such a class.

Thus, he lacks standing to assert

the argument on behalf of others.

Moreover, respondent

has also shown that the United States Supreme Court has
not yet ruled that blood samples cannot be taken without
the consent of such persons with alleged religious scruples,
nor has it created such a constitutionally protected class.
The Court expressly reserved the question for a later time
in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).

Thus,

Utah's statute should not be prematurely ruled unconstitutionally overbroad absent resolution of the above issue
first.

Additionally, when a court interprets a statute,

it should presume that the legislature was aware of the
relevant case law in effect at the time, and intended the
statute to be read in light of, and in harmony with the
existing case law.

Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc.,

398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970), U.S.
v. Thomas, 82 U.S. 337

(1872).

Moreover, this Court

stated in Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974), that:
it is the well established
rule that legislative enactments are
endowed with a strong presumption of
validity; and that they sh~uld not ~e
declared unconstitutional if there is
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any reasonable basis upon which they
can be found to come within the constitutional framework; and that a
statute will not be stricken down as
being unconstitutional unless it
appears to be so beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In determining whether the
statute carries out that purpose, it
should not be given any tortured or
strained application to conjectured
or hypothetical situations, but should
be understood and applied in a fair,
realistic and practical manner to
the situation confronted, and in the
awareness that all of the law is not
stated in one sentence or one paragraph,
but a statute is to be construed and
applied in relation to other requirements of the law.
Id. at p. 806-807.
In the case at bar, appellant objects to the
language of Section 76-5-207 which allows police to use
11

any chemical test administered in any manner.

11

Without

specifying the constitutional standards enunciated in
Schmerber, and Rochin, supra, which govern such activity.
In short, appellant contends that the statute is uncon-

stitutionally overbroad because Schmerber and Rochin, supra,
were not codified in the statute.

However, according to

the above rules of statutory interpretation,this Court

should presume that in enacting the statute, the legislatun
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intended that it be read in light of the governing standards
of Schmerber and Rochin, supra.

In other words the statute

should be interpreted as requiring that when a blood te~t
is taken without consent and without a warrant, it may be
taken only upon probable cause after arrest, and by a
qualified personnel in a medical setting. Consequently,
the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
In summary, even if appellant is allowed to raise
the issue of unconstitutional overbreadth of Section 765-207, supra, for the first time on appeal his argument
lacks merit because he has no standing to attack the
statute, and because the statute is not overly broad in
its application.
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D.
THE ADMISSION INTO
EVIDENCE OF THE CHEMICAL
TEST RESULTS OF THE BLOOD
SAMPLE DID NOT VIOLATE
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Appellant concedes at pages 13-14 of his brief
that the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution has been held
to be applicable only to evidence which is of a testimonial
or communicative nature, and does not extend to physical
evidence such as blood samples taken involuntarily from
an arrestee.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).

Nevertheless, appellant claims that the wording of Utah's
Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination contained in Article 1, Section 12 extends a greater
to him than that accorded by the Fifth Amendment.

privil~

He

argues that Article 1, Section 12 prohibits the admissibili'
of any evidence taken without his consent, including nontestimonial physical evidence, which tends to incriminate
him.
At the outset, respondent reasserts that the
record shows appellants blood sample was not involuntari.!1
extracted (Point I-A, supra), and therefore appellant's
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privilege against self-incrimination was not violated
under either the federal of state constitutional provisions.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the blood sample was
taken without appellant's consent, respondent submits
that the extent of the privilege accorded by the Utah
Constitution is no greater than that of the Federal
ConstitutiDn.

It should be noted that this issue has

previously been before this court and has been rejected
in dictum.

See State v. VanDam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976).
The language of the two constitutional provisions

is as follows: Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution -

"No person . • . shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution - "The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself.
A review of cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court, the supreme courts of other jurisdictions
with identical or similiar language as found in Article 1,
Section 12, and a review of Utah cases clearly refutes
the interpretation of Article 1, Section 12, appellant
would have this Court adopt.
One of the foremost authorities on evidence,
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Professor Wigmore, discusses in his treatise on Evidence
the history of the privilege against self-incrimination,
the forms of disclosure protected, and the ever-present
problem of interpretation of legislative intent as pertaining to the drafter of state constitutions.

He gives

a few indicia which can be used to help explain what the
drafters of various constitutions meant by their words,
and concludes with the assertion that "the

probabiliti~

substantially favor the conclusion that the constitutional
protections were originally intended only to prevent a
return to the hated practice of compelling a person, in
a criminal proceeding directed at him, to swear against
himself."

2
The learned professor further states in § 2263

the interpretation of the privilege given by most every
jurisdiction in the United States, including the United
States Supreme Court:
The history of the privilege
(§

2250 supra)--especially the spirit

of the struggle by which its extablishment came about--suggests that the
privilege is limited to testimonial

2

Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2252, p.324.
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disclosures.
It was directed at the
employment of legal process to extract
from the person's own lips an admission
of guilt, which would thus take the
place of other evidence. That is, it
was intended to prevent the use of
legal compulsion to extract from the
person a sworn communication of his
knowledge of facts which would
incriminate him.

*

*

*

In other words, it is not merely
any and every compulsion that is the
kernel of the privilege, in history
and in the constitutional d~finitions,
but testimonial compulsion.
The majority of courts in jurisdictions where
this question of self-incrimination has arisen have found
the state and federal self-incrimination statutes to be
identical in application, though different in written form.
In State v. Moore, 79 Wash.2d 51, 483 P.2d 630
(1971), the Washington Supreme Court ruled that their
state's constitutional provision in Art. I, § 9, providing
that no person shall be compelled to give "evidence"
against himself,provides the same guarantee as that provided in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
and that protection of both constitutional provisions
extended only to testimonial or communicative evidence.

3

Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2263, p.378.
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The Arizona Court in State v. Stelzriede, 101
Ariz. 385, 420 P.2d 170 (1966), held that the privilege
against self-incrimination protects an accused only from
being compelled to provide the state with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative

nature, and this privilege

is not violated by a compulsion which makes a suspect the
source of real or physical evidence.

This ruling was

in light of an Arizona constitutional provision almost
identical to Utah's which states in Art. 2, § 10, that
"no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
give evidence against himself • •
The Oklahoma Constitution which states in part
"no person shall be compelled to give evidence which
will tend to incriminate him.

, " was held in State

v. Thompson, 538 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. 1975), to be
consistent with the common law, and affording no greater
privilege than the Fifth Amendment.

This ruling over-

turned an earlier 1964 decision, and brought the case
law in line with the United States Supreme Court's decisior.
in Schmerber, supra, limiting the privilege to testimonial
evidence.
While respondent could discover no Utah cases
where this Court has clearly indicated whether this state
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follows the United States Supreme Court and the majority
of other state supreme courts in limiting the privilege
to testimonial evidence, there are three cases which shed
some light on this issue.
In State v. Spencer, 28 Utah 2d 12, 497 P.2d 636
(1972), this court stated that requiring a defendent to
participate in a line-up did not violate his privilege
against self-incrimination under Article 1, Section 12 of
the State Constitution.
In State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 251 516 P.3d 354
(1973), this Court dismissed a defendent's contention
that he was compelled to give evidence against himself
when the police seized and subjected articles of clothing
belonging to him to scientific tests.
Thus, in the above cases the compulsory production
of non-testimonial evidence was not found violative of
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
Moreover, in State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231,
461 P.2d 297 (1969), the Court dealt with an appeal from
a murder conviction based, in part, on a claim that a
paraffin test, taken to ascertain the presence of gun powder
on the hands of the petitioner was an unconstitutional
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search and seizure.

In support of its conclusion that

the appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
the Court cited with approval to Annotation:

Physical

Examination or Exhibition of, or Tests upon, Suspect or
Accused, As Violating Rights Guaranteed by Federal Constitu:
16 L. Ed. 2d 1335-1336.

'i\Then quoted in full, that passage

also has bearing on the Fifth Amendment concerns involved
in the instant case:
In numerous federal cases, the
principle has been applied or recognized that it is proper, subject to
qualifications relating to the concept of fundamental fairness, to
make use of the body of a person
charged with crime, or detained with
reasonable cause, as the case may be,
either as real or physical evidence
in itself, or as the basis for evidence of that nature developed from
such use (as distinguished from
verbal or "testimonial" declarations),
without violating prohibitions against
self-incrimination as embodied in the
Fifth Amendment, or implied by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth
Araendment, or without violating
the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and
seizures as applicable directly to
federal prosecutions, and, through
the agency of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to state prosecutions.
Surrunarizing up to this point, the United States
Supreme Court, and the majority of state courts have held
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that the privilege against self-incrimination is limited
to testimonial evidence.

Historical fact fortifies this

position, indicating the intent of the drafters of the
United States Constitutions and the state constitutions
patterned after it, was to include only testimonial evidence in the privilege.

Although this court has not

specifically resolved this issue, there is caselaw
indicating that non-testimonial evidence is not protected
by Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
In support of his argument that it is an established doctrine of this court that Article 1, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution "is broader than the comparable
federal self-incrimination privilege of the Fifth Amendment,"
Appellant's Brief at page 13, the appellant cites only
two cases as authority.

Appellant cites first to the

1912 case of State v. Sirmay, 40 Utah 525, 122 p.748 (1912),
in which petitioner, convicted of first degree murder,
appealed in part on the ground that matching his shoes
against footprints at the scene of the murder compelled
him to give evidence against himself in violation of the
Utah Constitution.
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The passage quoted by appellant states:
It is generally held, and as
stated in 12 Cyc. 402, that although
evidence, incQuding documents,and
other articles, may have been obtained in a criminal case by unfair
or illegal methods, it is nevertheless, as a general rule, admissible
if relevant, provided the accused
is not thereby compelled to do any
act which incriminates him, and
the confession or incriminatin'g admission is not extorted from him;
and by the weight of authority it
is held to be error to compel the
accused to submit to a comparison
of footprints and to permit a
witness who was oresent when the
accused was forcibly compelled to
place his foot in footprints, or
to surrender his shoes for the
purpose of making a comparison,
to testify as to the result; but
where the accused voluntarily
places his foot in the tracks, or
surrenders his shoes to the sheriff,
he cannot object to evidence that
they seemed to fit. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 753.
The appellant relies on a sentence which stated that pol~
may not properly admit evidence obtained by compelling a
defendent to "do any act which incriminates him."

How-

ever, on closer scrutiny, the fact that this statement ~~F
merely dicta, and inapplicable to the instant case is
apparent.

First, the statement was dicta, because the
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court held that the petitioner voluntarily allowed his
shoes to be compared to the footprints, so he was not
"compelled

to give evidence against himself."

Secondly,

the statement that evidence is admissible only if "the
accused is not compelled to do anything which incriminates
him" is relevant only to evidence obtained by "unfair or
illegal methods."

The evidence in the instant case (the

blood test results) was fairly and legally obtained (see
Points I A & B, supra).

Also, although the Court said

that an accused may not be compelled to do "any act,"
when read in context with the next phrase, which states:
"and the confession or incriminating admission is not
extorted from him," the scope of "any act" is limited to
confessions or verbal admissions.

Thus, although the

phrase "compelled to do any act" is somewhat vague, the
court intended it to refer only to testimonial evidence.
Finally, the Sirmay decision was decided in 1912, long
before this Court's more recent treatment of the issue
in Spencer, Sims

and Kelbach, supra.

Appellant also cites to State v. VanDam, 554
P.2d 1324

(Utah 1976) to illustrate that Art.l Section 12

of the Utah Constitution extends broader self-incrimination
protections than the Fifth Amendment.

In VanDam, a rape
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case, the court admitted in evidence hair samples taken
without resistance from the defendant.

Although this is

clearly permissable under the Fifth Amendment, the defens.
appealed on the grounds that this violated Art. 1 Sectio
of the Utah Constitution.

In its opinion, the court

acknowledged that the question of the breadth of Art. 1
Section 12, vis-a-vis the Fifth Amendment, was before the
Court.

However, as noted earlier, this question was not

resolved because the case was disposed of on other grourn
(the evidence was held admissable because its production
was voluntary, not compulsory):
Defendant urges that the hair
taking (after arrest and while in
custody, when defendant volunteered
that he wouldn't resist but would
object) violated his Utah and
federal constitutional rights under
the Utah section and Fourth and
Fifth federal Amendments.
Defendant
also urges that the Utah section
had a broader application than the
Fifth Amendment.
As to state and federal constitutional provisions mentioned,
defendant was not compelled to give
a) evidence, b) or be a witness
against himself.
The officers
relieved him of the hair (without
any resistance).
Under such circumstances the cases say no constitutional rights are violated.
554 P.2d 1324,1325.
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Since the court disposed of the case without
ruling on the breadth of Article 1, Section 12, VanDam,
supra, lends no strength to the claim that this section
extends the privilege against self-incrimination to
non-testimonial as well as testimonial evidence.
In summary, the claim that Article 1, Section 12
extends to non-testimonial evidence is not an established
doctrine of this court nor of a majority of those jurisdictions
which have addressed the issue.

Moreover, the authorities

appellant cites to support this claim are not on point.
Respondent submits that the extent of the privilege accorded
by the Utah Constitution is the same as that of the United
States Constitution, and consequently the lower court's
decision to admit the results of the blood test should
stand.
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POINT II
THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE
BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS WERE ESTABLISHED BY EXPERT TESTIMONY AND
PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.

In the present case a blood test administerE

to appellant approximately 1.5 hours after the accider
registere~ a blood alcohol level of

.28%.

Appellant

argues that the test results were improperly admitted

into evidence because the prosecution's expert witnes!

allegedly did not establish the probative value of the

test results as required by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.:
(J953), as amended, which states:
In any action or proceeding in
which it is material to prove that
a person was driving under the influence of alcohol, the results of
a chemical test or tests as authorized in § 41-6-44.10 shall be admitted as evidence if the chemical
test was taken within one hour of
the alleged incident. The level
of the alcohol determined to be in
the blood by the chemical test
shall be presumed to be not less
than the blood alcohol level of
the person at the time of the
incident.
If the chemical test
was not taken within one hour after
the alleged incident, the evidence
of the amount of alcohol in the
person's blood as shown by the chemical test is admissible if expert
testimony establishes its probative
value and the results of said test
may be given prima facie effect if
established by expert testimony.
(Emphasis added.)
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Respondent submits that the probative value of
the test results was established, and consequently the
test should have prima facie effect as to the presumption
4
of intoxication.
Appellant admits that the leading case in this
jurisdiction defining "probative value" is State v. Scott,
111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021 (1947).

4

This case states

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) states in relevant portion
that "the presumption established by Section 41-6-44(b)
of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, relating to blood alcohol
percentage shall be applicable to this section . . . "
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(b) (3) states:
(b)
In any criminal prosecution
for a violation of subsection (a) of
this section relating to driving a
vechicle while under the influence
of alcohol or in any civil suit or
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any
person while driving or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, the
amount of alcohol in the person's
blood at the time alleged as shown
by chemical analysis of the person's
blood, breath, or other bodily substance shall give rise to the following presumptions:

*

*

*

3.
If there was at the time
0.08 per cent or more by weight of
alcohol in the person's blood, it
shall be presumed that the person
was under the influence of alcohol;
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"that all evidence having probative value-that is, that
tends to prove an issue, is admissible."
is clear and simple.

The standard

The probative value threshold is

met as long as evidence tends to prove an issue.

The

facts reflect that this standard was met.
Trooper Clark Bowles, an authority on the subject of alcohol absorption and burn-off rates, was called
by the prosecution as an expert witness to establish the
blood test's probative value

(T.100 Vol. III).

In cal-

culating the outside parameters of the appellant's blood
alcohol level at the time of the accident, Trooper Bowles
used data on absorbtion and burn-off rates that he
through over one hundred experiments.

acq~r~

(T.102 Vol. III.)

He stated that on an empty stomach alcohol was absorbed
into the blood stream within 15-30 minutes, and if there
was food in the stomach the absorbtion process took from
1 to 1.5 hours

(T.108 Vol. III).

He testified that the

absorbtion rate is relatively constant and does not vary
much between individuals and the blood alcohol burn-off
is also relatively constant (T.106 Vol. III).

He also

stated that the average burn-off rate is .015% per hour,
extending possible up to . 02% in some individuals (T. llO,
119 Vol. III).

Taking all these factors into consideration,
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when presented the facts in evidence in this case (T.139
Vol. III), Trooper Bowles testified that it was not possible for appellant's blood alcohol level to have been
below .08% at the time of the accident (T.141 Vol. III).
Due to the many variables involved, such as when appellant
last ate and consumed liquor prior to the accident, Trooper
Bowles could not state with certainty what the

~

blood alcohol level was at the time of the accident.
However, he did state with certainty that appellant's
blood alcohol level could not have been below .08% based
on the facts in evidence.
This same issue arose in a case recently argued
before this court.

In State v. Chavez,

P.2d

(No.

16132, filed December 31, 1979), the petitioner, appealing
a conviction for automobile homicide, claimed that the
prosecution had not established the probative value of
blood test results taken 1.5 hours after an accident.
As in the instant case, the expert witness in Chavez,supra,
Dr. Finkle, did not know when the appellant took his last
drink, and so could not relate back the blood test results
with absolute certainty.

In fact, Dr. Finkle's conclusion

that petitioner's blood alcohol level was above the
statutory presumption (.08%) at the time of the accident
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was stated more equivocally than was the conclusion of
Trooper Bowles.

Dr. Finkle stated it was "extremely

unlikely" that the peritioner's blood alcohol would be
below . 10%, where as Trooper Bowles, in the instant case,
testified that in his opinion "it would not be possible"
for appellant's blood alcohol level to have been below
.08%

(T.141Vol. III).
However, despite the uncertainty of the expert

witness in Chavez, supra, this Court in the conclusion
of that opinion stated:
Defendant also asserts that the
District Court erred in admitting the
results of the blood analysis, in instructing the jury concerning the
presumptions of intoxication as set
forth in Section 41-6-44(b) 3, and
in denying defendant's motion to dismiss, contending that there was little
or no evidence that defendant was
intoxicated at the time of the collision. These arguments are without
merit and we do not discuss them.
Green Sheet Opinion at page 4.
Because the court in Chavez, ~· found the
prosecution to have met the probative value standard of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (1953), as amended, a similar
result should be reached in this case, where an even
stronger showing of probative value was made.
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Appellant argues that if he consumed some
alcohol between the accident and the time of his arrest,
then Trooper Bowles could not state with certainty whether appellant's blood alcohol level was above .08% at the
time of the accident.
Appellant's argument is totally hypothetical
and without any relation to the facts established in the
case.

Appellant introduced absolutely no evidence indi-

cating that he actually drank between the time of the
accident and his arrest, and the evidence that was introduced at trial lends no support to this hypothetical.
When appellant stopped and climbed out of his jeep, there
were three witnesses at the scene.

They observed that

his face was splattered with blood, that he had blood on
his teeth, and that he was bleeding from a cut on his
forehead

(T. 103,123,127,128 Vol. 1, T.35 Vol. II).
After one of the witnesses made a citizen's

arrest, appellant pushed by him and entered the house,
saying he was going to wash the blood from his face.

The

witnesses waited with appellant's brother in front of the
house for him to return.

Appellant was in the house and

out of the sight of the witnesses only momentarily (from
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30 seconds by one account (T. 126 Vol.l) to "a moment"
or three to four minutes by another account (T. 10, 13
Vol. II)).

He entered the house on the premise of wash-.

ing the blood from his face and mouth, and he returned
outside carrying a wash cloth.

The witnesses also

obsen~

the appellant's slurred speech, poor balance, and difficult
in walkini prior to his entering the house, and testifi~
that he appeared to be drunk (T. 9 8 Vol. 1) .

Under these

circumstances, the suggestion that during the few seconds
he was alone in the house he drank sufficient alcohol to
raise his blood alcohol level from below . 08% to . 28% is
totally implausible and unsupported by the record.
Combining the facts stated above with the expert
testimony of Trooper Bowles, the evidence presented in the
case has "tended to prove the issue of intoxication and
thus the probative value of the blood test results.
v. Scott, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021 (1947).
requirements of Utah Code Ann.

§

State

Consequently the

41-6-44.5 (1953), as

amended, were satisfied, and the blood test results sh~N
be given prima facie effect in establishing that appellant
was legally drunk at the time of the accident.
In the alternative, Respondent submits that the
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obligation to establish the "probative value" of the
blood test results under § 41-6-44.5, supra, does not
apply to automobile homicide proscutions under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1953), as amended, which expressly
provides, in relevant part:
(2)
The presumption established
by section 41-6-44(b) of the Utah
Motor Vehicle Act, relating to blood
alcohol percentage shall be applicable
to this section and any chemical test
administered on a defendant . . . after
his arrest . . . . , shall be admissible
in accordance with the rules of evidence.
Respondent merely points out the fact that the legislature
did specifically mention§ 41-6-44(b) of the Motor Vehicle
Act, to the exclusion of other statutes.

Futhermore,

§ 76-5-207(2) specifies that" . • . any chemical test
administered .

.

. shall be admissible in accordance with

the rules of evidence."

Respondent again points out the

fact that the legislature specifically stated that the
chemical tests be admissible according to the rules of
evidence, not according to § 41-6-44.5.
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POINT III
THE PROSECUTION FOR AUTOMOBILE
HOMICIDE WAS NOT BARRED BY UTAH'S
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE RULE AS PROVIDED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-401
(1953), AS AMENDED.
In the instant case, after the appellant was
arrested for a hit-and-run auto-pedestrian accident, it
was discovered that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol, without a driver's license and without
proper vehicle registration or safety inspection.

Appel-

lant was arraigned and pled guilty to these charges in
Justice's court, August 1, 1977.

Two days later his guilty

pleas on the above charges were vacated, and he was then
prosecuted in district court for automobile homicide and
failure to stop at the scene of an injury accident.
Appellant argues that the subsequent prosecution
in district court on the automobile homicide charge should

have been barred by the operation of Utah's Single Criminal
Episode Rule as Contained in Title 76, Chapter 1, sectioM
401 through 403 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended.
Respondent submits that the elements necessary
to bar a subsequent prosecution have not been established,
and consequently appellant's claim is without merit.
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Utah adopted Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (Supp.
1975) which bars a second prosecution for the same or
different offense arising out of the same criminal episodethat was the subject matter of the first prosecution.

It

reads:
(1)
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or mor~ offenses arising
out of a single criminal episode, a
subsequent prosecution for the same
or different offense arising out of
the same criminal episode is barred
if:
(a)
The subsequent prosecution
is for an offense that was or should
have been tried under § 76-1-402(2)
in the former prosecution; and
(b)
The former prosecution
(ii)
Resulted in conviction
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2)

(Supp.

1975), reads:
(2)
Whenever conduct may establish
separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court
otherwise orders to promote justice,
defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses
when: (a)
The offenses are within the
jurisdiciton of a single court, and
(b)
The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
Whether or not these provisions apply depends
on whether the conduct of the accused comes under the
definition of "single criminal episode."

Utah Code Ann.
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§

76-1-401 (Supp. 1975), defines "single criminal episode"

as follows:
In this part unless the context
requires different definition, 'single
criminal episode' means all conduct
which is closely related in time and
is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.
·As provided in these statutes, the following

elements must be established to bar a subsequent prosecutio:
1.

The offenses are within the jurisdiction of

a single court.
2.

The offenses are known to the prosecuting

attorney when the first information or indictment is brough:
3.

The offenses must be closely related in time.

4.

The offenses must arise from the same crirnina:

objective.
If any one of these elements is not established, then a
subsequent prosecution may not be barred.
Since the adoption of the Single Criminal Episode
Rule in 1973, this court has dealt with these elements~
the following cases:

State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah

1977); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577
Cooley, 575 P.2d 693
P.2d 373

(Utah 1977); StateJ'.:_

(Utah 1978); State v. Schroeder, 598

(Utah 1979); State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah

1979); Hupp v. Johnson,

P.2d

No. 16603 (Utah 19801·
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The first element that must be established is
that the various offenses were within the jurisdiction of
the same court (§ 76-1-402(2) (a) ,supra).

The intent of

the single criminal episode rule is to bar multiple prosecutions when those actions could have been joined.

When

joinder of separate offenses arising from the same course
of conduct is not possible because the offenses are not
within the jurisdiction of the same court, to hold that
separate prosecutions are barred would frustrate the intent
of the statute.

It would also force the state into the

undesirable position of prosecuting only some of the offenses
committed by a defendant.
The leading case on this issue is State v. Cooley,
575 P.2d 693 (Utah 1978).

Cooley, supra, involved a sit-

uation where a defendant was arrested and given two citations.
One citation, a class A misdemeanor was for failing to
stop at the command of a police officer.

The other was

for the class C misdemeanors of driving with an improper
license and having no tail lig~t on a boat trailer pulled
by the defendant's motor vehicle.
guilty to the class

The defendant pled

c misdemeanors before a justice of

the peace, and then claimed that he could not subsequently
be prosecuted in district court on the class A misdemeanor.
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This Court held that the plea of guilty before the justice

of the peace did not bar a subsequent prosecution in distri
court on the class A misdemeanor.

The reasoning of the

court was that although the offenses arose from the same

criminal episode, the justice court did not have jurisdicti
to hear the class A misdemeanor, and the district court
did not have jurisdiction to hear the class B misdemeanor
prosecutions.

Because the offenses were not "within the

jurisdiction of a single court."

The subsequent prosecutio

was allowed.
Appellant, in the present case, concedes that
Cooley, supra, is controlling (appellant's brief at p. 22-1
However, without offering any new theory

for it's reversal

and relying only on the Cooley, supra, dissent, appellant
contends that the decision should be overturned.

In essenc

appellant argues that pursuant to Art. VIII, Section 7 of
the Utah Constitution, district courts have original
jurisdiciton in all criminal matters.

However, as

Cool~,

supra, carefully sets forth, this broad grant of jurisdicti
is qualified.
Article VIII, Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution provides:
The District Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in
this Constitution, and not prohibited
by law;
[Emphasis added.]
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The district court's original jurisdiction may
be limited by statutory prohibitions.

One such limitation

is found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-16-1 (1953), as amended,
which provides:
All public offenses triable in
the district courts, except cases
appealed from justices' and city
courts, must be prosecuted by information or indictment, . .
[Emphasis added]
Also, pursuant to Art. VIII Section 7 the prosecution of
non-indictable misdemeanors has been delegated to justice's
courts by legislative enactment:
U.C.A., 1953, 77 16 1. All public
offenses triable in the district
courts, except cases appealed from
justices' and city courts, must be
prosecuted by information or indictment . . . .
U.C.A., 1953, 78-5-4(1). Justices'
courts have jurisdictio~ of the
following public offenses committed
within the respective counties in
which such courts are established:
(a)
All class B and class C
misdemeanors punishable by a fine less
than $300 or by imprisonment in the
county jail or municipal, prison not
exceeding six months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment.
(b)
All infractions and the
punishments prescribed for them.
The clear implication of these provisions is
that the original jurisdiction of district courts extends
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only to cases brought by information and indictment.
Since class B & C misdemeanor charges cannot be brought
by information or indictment (see Haikki v. Faux, 16 Ut~h
2d 132, 396 P.2d 867

(1964))

they do not come under the

original criminal jurisdiction of the district courts,
and the single criminal episode rule is inapplicable.
·Last year this court considered another case
dealing with this same issue and affirmed the Cooley,supra,
decision.

In State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), a

defendant appealed from a conviction in Ogden City Court
on the misdemeanor charges of carrying a loaded firearm
in a vehicle, and possession of marijuana, and a subsequent
conviction in state district court for the felony of
possession of a firearm by a convicted person.

The appeal

claimed that the district court prosecution was barred
by the single criminal episode rule.

This court reject~

petitioner's claim and stated:
A felony or indictable misdemeanor
must therefore be prosecuted by information or indictment in the district
court.
On the other hand, a nonindictable misdemeanor is appropriately
prosecuted by complaint in Justice's
or city courts.

*

*

*

This is totally consistent with our
decision in State v. Cooley.
Sosa, at 344, 345.
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In this appeal the charges brought in the
Justice Court were class B misdemeanors, whereas the
subsequent prosecution for automobile homicide is a
third degree felony.

Applying the rule established in

Cooley, supra, and reaffirmed in Sosa, supra, the subsequent prosecution may not properly be barred.
The second element that must be established to
bar a subsequent prosecution, is that:
The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment. [Emphasis added]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (2) (b).
This requirement is satisfied only if the offense that
is subsequently prosecuted is known when the defendant
is arraigned on the first information or indictment.

In

this case, the misdemeanor offenses were not brought by
information or indictment, they were not even brought by
a complaint (M.7,9) !

Consequently, because appellant was

not arraigned on an information or indictment this element
of the single episode rule was not satisfied.
The third element that must be established is
that the prior and subsequently prosecuted offenses were
closely related in time.

Respondent submits that the
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automobile homicide offense was not closely related in
time to the misdemeanor charges appellant pled guilty ~.
In State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977).
this Court dealt with a similar issue.

In that case the

defendant, at gunpoint, threatened a police officer, took
his gun and locked him in the trunk of his patrol car.
The defendant then fled in his own vehicle.
miles later he picked up some hitchhikers.

Sixty-five
When the

defendant realized he was being followed by the police,
and that a roadblock was set up to apprehend him he informed the hitchhikers that they were his hostages.
appeal from his convictions for aggravated kidnapping

On
a~

subsequently for aggravated robbery (taking the officer's
gun) petitioner relied on the single criminal episode
rule to bar the subsequent prosecution.
firmed the convictions.

This court af-

The Court held that not only was

the criminal purpose of the robbery unrelated to the
kidnapping, but also that "there was a distinct
in time,
location,

differ~~

(that necessary to travel some 65 miles)

[and]

(two separate counties}
There was no evidence presented at trial in

the present case as to how far the appellant had driven
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prior to the accident.

However the thrust of Ireland,

supra, was not that the defendant had driven 65 miles
between crimes, but the fact that the two offenses were
separated by time and distance.
In the instant case there was a "distinct
difference" in time and location between the misdemeanor
offenses and the automobile homicide.

Although the misde-

meanor offenses were discovered at the time of the accident,
they occured before the accident.
The driving under the influence offense occured
at the instant the appellant entered the car and began
driving while intoxicated.

The offenses of driving with-

out a license, improper registration, and no vehicle safety
inspection also occured at the instant appellant began
driving the car, for until a person begins driving it is
not illegal to be without a drivers license in a car that
is not properly registered and has not been safety inspected.
However, the automobile homicide did not occur until sometime later when the vehicle appellant was driving struck
and killed Michael Winn.
Consequently, because the class B misdemeanors
were merely discovered, but not committed at the time of
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the accident, they are not closely related in time as
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401,

(1953), as amended, has been

interpreted and applied by this Court in State v. Irela~,
supra.
Neither do the facts of the law support the
existance of the final element, that the subsequent charge
of automobile homicide stemmed from the same criminal
purpose as the misdemeanor offenses.
571 P.2d 577

In State v.

Cerni~,

(Utah 1977) the defendant was charged and

convicted for failure to stop at the command of a police
officer and the unlawful taking of a vehicle.

The defendar.

appealed the subsequent prosecution for failure to stop,
basing the appeal on the single criminal episode rule.
This Court held that the rule did not apply because the
offenses did not stern from the same criminal objective.
The Court reasoned that "the offenses are different and
the proof requirements are different," Cornish, at 578.
Similarly, the offenses and the proof requirement
in the instant case are different.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44

(1953), as amended,

defines the offense of driving under the influence of
alcohol.

It states, in part:

It is unlawful
. for any
person who is under the influence of
alcohol . . . to drive or be in actual
physical control of any vehicle within
this state.
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However, the offense of automobile homicide, is defined by
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207

(1953), as amended, in the following

manner:
Criminal homicide constitutes
automobile homicide if the actor, while
under the influence of intoxicating
liquor . . . to a degree which renders the actor incapable of safely
driving a vehicle, causes the death
of another by operating a motor vehicle
in a negligent manner.
Section 76-1-207 (1), supra.
From these statutory definitions it is evident that
the offenses of driving while under the influence, and automobile homicide are distinct and separate offenses.

The

automobile homicide offense requires proof of several elements
not included in the driving under the influence offense.
The only similarity between the two offenses is a
common element they share; that the driver operate the vehicle
while legally drunk.

Simply because the offenses share a

common element does not give rise to any presumption that a
defendant who commits both, albeit at t different time and
place, acted with the same criminal objective.

Such reasoning

is no more logical than it would be to reason that because
simple theft and armed robbery have theft as a common element,
a man acts with the same criminal objective when he steals a
candy bar at a grocery store as when he commits armed robbery
at a service station.
When the appellant committed the offense of driving
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under the influence of alcohol, the criminal objective
was simply to drive the vehicle while he was drunk.

How-

ever, the criminal objective at the time of the accident
was much different.

There, the criminal purpose was to

drive while "incapable of safely driving" and to "negligent
run a red light, resulting in the accident and death of
the victim.

Therefore, in the instant case the driving

under the "influence and automobile homicide offenses are
different, the proof requirements are different, and the
criminal objective was different.
The remaining misdemeanor offenses, i.e. , drivino
a car improperly registered, without a safety inspection
accN~

and without a license, are totally unrelated to the
and the resulting automobile homicide charge.
This court dealt with a similar issue in
Johnson, No. 16602,

P.2d

(Utah 1980).

~

In Hupp,

~

the defendant appealed from the denial of a petition for
an extraordinary writ to require a circuit court judge to
dismiss a drunk driving complaint filed after the judge
accepted pleas for driving without a license, no safety
inspection sticker, and no registration certificate.

The

Court stated:
We reject the contention that
76-1-401 is applicable.
The citations charge separate, independant
§
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offenses which were committed at
different times and were entirely
unrelated to each other. The four
offenses were not committed to
accomplish a"single criminal objective".
Id. at p.l

of greensheet opinion .

In the present case, the traffic offenses appellant was
charged with have as little in common with the automobile
homicide offense as did the traffic offenses with the
subsequent prosecution in Hupp, supra.

Consequently,

appellant was not acting with the same "criminal purpose"
when he drove the car without a license registration and
safety inspection as when he struck Michael Winn and then
fled the scene of the accident.
In summary, to bar a subsequent prosecution, it
must be established that the offense subsequently prosecuted
was under the jurisdiction of the same court that handled
the prior convictions; the prosecutor was aware at the time
of the first information or indictment that the subsequent
charge could be brought; the offenses were closely related
in time; and the offenses arose from the same criminal
objective.

If any one of these elements is missing the

single criminal episode rule is inapplicable and the subsequent
prosecution may not be barred.

Respondent asserts that all

of these elements were not established, and consequently the
prosecution for automobile homicide was proper.
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Assuming, arguendo, all of the aforementioned
elements were established, respondent submits the applicat:
of the single criminal episode rule would still be
priate under alternate

inap~ro·

theories.

First, the justice court lacked jurisdiction to
arraign the appellant.

Consequently its actions were null

and void, ·so in effect there was no prior prosecution.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-57-2

(1953), as amended, states:

Other than as provided by section
77-13-17, proceedings and actions before a justices' court for a misdemeanor offense must be commenced by
complaint under oath, setting forth
the offense charged, with such particulars of time, place, person and
property as to enable the defendant
to understand distinctly the character of the offense complained of,
and to answer the complaint. The
complaint shall be commenced before
a magistrate within the precinct of
the county or city in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.
[Emphasis added].
This requirement is supported by the following statutes
under title 77 chapter II of the Utah Code which deals
with making complaints before a magistrate:
~Every person who has reason to
believe that a crime or public offense
has been committed must make complaint
against such person before som magistrate having authority to make inquiry
of the same.
[Emphasis added].

Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-2

(1953), as amended.
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~when a complaint is made before
a magistrate charging a person with
the commission of a crime or public
offense, such magistrate must examine
the complainant, under oath, as to his
knowledge of the commission of the
offense charged, and he may also examine any other persons and may take
their depositions.
[Emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-3 (1953), as amended.
--When an officer or other person
shall bring any person he has arrested
without a warrant before a magistrate,
it is the duty of such officer or person to specify the charge upon which
he has made the arrest.
It is then
the duty of the magistrate or the county attorney to prepare a complaint of
the offense charged, and cause the
officer or some other person to subscribe
and make oath to such complaint, and
file it.
[Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. §

77-11-4 (1953), as amended.

The statutes require that an action in justice court must
be commenced by a complaint.

If an action is not initiated

by a formal complaint, this court has held that the justice
court does not obtain jurisdiction.
Court of Salt Lake County,

Spangler v. District

104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943).

In Spangler, supra, this Court enforced the complaint under oath requirement of § 77-11-3 and § 77-57-2,
supra, strictly, declaring the entire proceeding void because the complaining officer had not sworn an oath to the
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complaint he signed.

The Court stated:

While no set formula is required
to constitute an oath in verifying a
complaint, there must be an unequivocal
act whereby affiant consciously takes
upon himself the obligation of an
oath . . . Where it is admitted, or established by proper proof, that nothing
was done except to hand a written, typed
or printed paper to the complaining
.party, who without more merely subscribed
his name therto, such does not constitute
a complaint under oath as required by our
statute.
Id. at 756, 758.
In the instant case the arresting officer did
not swear an oath to the complaint,
sign the complaint,

(M. 5 2) .

(T. 52).

He did not

He never even brought a corn-

plaint before the justice of the peace.

In fact, the

record plainly indicates that the justice of the peace

arraigned the appellant without any complaint at all (M. 1,
The justice testified that he was assured

9,26,45,49,52).

by the county attorney's office that they would "bring··
a complaint right up .

(M. 29) .

of a complaint is not adequate.

However the assuranc

Utah Law clearly requires

that the proceedings in a justice's court for a misdemeum
offense "must be commenced by a complaint under oath,"
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-57-2

(1953), as amended.

In summary,

the justice's court never received jurisdiction overt~
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misdemeanor offenses, and any action taken by that court
with respect to those offenses is null and void.
Consequently, because the prior prosecutions
are vacated, there was not a subsequent prosecution under
§

76-1-401 thru 403, supra.
Finally, before the automobile homicide prose-

cution was begun in district court, the justice court
vacated its action in arraigning appellant and accepting
his guilty pleas on the misdemeanor charges.

As a result

of the order to vacate, the appellant suffered no penalties
from the purported actions of justice of the peace.
Appellant paid no fines, he did not make any expenditures
for attorney fees, he spent no more time in jail than he
would have anyway while awaiting his trial on the felony
charges, and there will be no residual effect on his driving
record.

In short, he has not been required to stand the

expense and hardship of trial which was the concern of the
dissent in State v. Cooley, 575 P.2d 693 (Utah 1978) cited
at length in appellant's brief a p. 23.
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POINT IV
THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE STATUTE, REQUIRING PROOF OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE, AS
AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE SHOULD BE
LIMITED TO PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION.
In State v. Chavez,

P.2d

No. 16132 (Utah

1980), this Court ruled that the negligence element of the
automobile· homicide statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (191:
as amended)

requires a showing of criminal negligence rather

than ordinary or simple negligence, and that failure to so
instruct the jury was reversible error.

Appellant argues

that Chavez, supra, is dispositive of the instant case be·
cause the trial court rejected appellant's criminal negliger.
instruction and instead instructed the jury that ordinary
negligence was the standard.

It must be stressed that

appellant's trial occurred years prior to the Chavez decisic"
Respondent submits that even though Chavez, supra,
did change the negligence requirement by overturning this
Court's previous decisions in State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d
1056

(Utah 1977), State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah

1977), and State v. Wade, 472 P.2d 398

(Utah 1977), the

Chavez, supra, decision should have prospective application
only, and therefore is inapplicable to appellant's case.
The traditional theory with respect to retroactivi·.
is the Blackstonian view that judges do not make law, theY
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merely discover it.

Accordingly, when a court reverses a

prior decision, the new rule is retroactive because it
reveals what the true law has always been.

However, modern

scholars and jurists have taken a more pragmatic approach
to the laws governing retroactivity.

Justice Cardozo in

Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287
U.S.

358

(1932), recognized that to avoid injustice or

hardship, some decisions should not be applied retroactively,
and each state should decide whether new rules of law should
be given retroactive or prospective application.

Id. at 364.

The United States Supreme Court followed this
reasoning in Wainright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973), a case
factually similar to the instant case.

In Wainright, supra,

the petitioner had been convicted of violating Florida's
"crimes against nature" statute.

In a subsequent case in-

volving the same offense the State Supreme Court held the
same statute void for vagueness.

However, because the new

ruling reversed several previous opinions upholding the
validity of the statute, the court gave the new ruling
prospective effect only, stating, "In view of our former
decisions, this judgement holding the felony statute void
is not retroactive, but prospective only."
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Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla, Sup. Ct. 1971).
Because the law he was convicted under was held unconstitutional Stone appealed his conviction, to the State Sup.rel
Court, however, the court rejected the appeal and affirmed
the prospective effect of the new rule.

Stone then

collaterally attacked his conviction, and the case eventual.
was heard ·by the United States Supreme Court, which rejecte
the appeal, stating that the holding in Franklin v.

Sta~,

supra:
. . did not remove the fact
that when appellees committed the
acts with which they were charged,
they were on c+ear notice that their
conduct was criminal under the statute
as then construed.
Thus, the Florida
Supreme Court expressly ruled in
Franklin that "this judgment holding
the felony statute void is not retroactive, but prospective only." and
subsequently the Florida courts denied
appellee Stone's request for relief
based on the Franklin case. The
State Supreme Court did not ove~rule
Delancy with respect t~ pre-Fr~~kl~n
convictions. Nor was it constitutionally
compelled to do so or to make retroactive its new construction of the
Florida statute: "A state in defining
the limits of adherence to precedent
may make a choice for itself between
the principle of forward operation and
that of relation backward.
It may say
that decisions of its highest court,
though later overruled, are law none
the less for intermediate transactions."
Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil
U.S. 358. 364

&

Refining Co., 281

(1932).
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It is thus, well settled law that this court
may, as a matter of constitutional law, give its opinions
which overrule prior opinions prospective application only..
(See also State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977)).
Because the overruling opinion (Chavez, supra)
requiring an instruction on criminal negligence in automobile homicide cases, goes to a procedural error at trial;
the standards developed to govern prospective versus
retrospective application of a new criminal procedural
ruling must be reviewed.
The criteria for retroactive application of a new
court announced rule in criminal cases were announced by
the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719

(1966).

In that case the Court refused to

retroactively apply Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
In determining whether to give retrospective or prospective
effect to decisions adopting new rules in criminal cases,
the Court listed three considerations:
the new rule;
and

(1) the purpose of

(2) the reliance placed upon the former rule;

(3) the effect which retroactive application of the

new rule would have on the administration of justice.
See 384 U.S. at 727.

The major thrust of the first factor
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is whether the new ruling enhances "the reliability of
the fact-finding process at trial," Johnson, supra, at 72!,
However, the court in Johnson, supra, noted that the

qu~sti

of whether the fact finding process is enhanced "is neces·
sarily a matter of degree," Johnson,
is "a question of probabilities."

~,

at 728-729, anc

Id. at 729.

In subseque

criminal procedure cases the United States Supreme Court
has held that these "probabilities must in turn be weighed
against the prior justified reliance upon the old standard:
and the impact of the retroacti vi ty upon the administratio:.
of justice."

Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 287 (1972),

see also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298

After

(1970).

weighing these factors, if "the unusual force of the counte
vailing considerations," Id. at 285-286,

(i.e. the prior

reliance and the effect on the administration of justice)
weighs in favor of prospective application, then the new
ruling should be applied only to cases tried after the
rule has been announced.

n5

Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 732.

Turning now to the instant case, the first facto~
to be considered is the purpose of the new ruling.
State v. Chavez,

P.2d

In

No. 16132 (Utah 1980), t~

Court held:
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We are therefore of the opinion
that our previous cases holding that
automobile homicide requires only proof
of simple negligence under Section
76-5-207 are in error, and are overruled.
And we hold that a conviction
of automobile homicide requires an
instruction on criminal negligence as
that term is defined in Section 76-21-3 (4), and a determination thereof
by the jury.
The purpose of the ruling is to ensure that a person is
not convicted of automobile homicide unless he acted with
criminal negligence.

The issue then is whether a prospective

application of the Chavez, supra, ruling would frustrate
this purpose and if so whether the integrity of the factfinding process would be impaired.

However, it must be

kept in mind that this determination is "a matter of degree"
Johnson, supra, at 728-729.

On closer scrutiny the tenor

of instruction #25 in the instant case indicates that the
absence of a negligent homicide instruction did not impair
the fact finding process to any significant degree.

The

pertinent part of instruction No. 25 stated:
2.
That the defendant then and there
drove the motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor
to a degree which rendered him incapable
of safely driving a vehicle; and,
3.
That the defendant so operated or
drove the motor vehicle in a negligent
manner; and,
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4.
That the defendant then and there
injured Micharl A. Winn, causing his
death, by operating or driving such
vehicle while in such intoxicated
condition and in such manner.
If you find that the evidence
proves each of the above elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty.
(R.

72)

From this instruction a reasonable jury could not fail to
understand that they could not convict the appellant for
merely being negligent.

In addition to negligence, the jur

was instructed that they must also be convinced "beyond a
reasonable doubt 11 that appellant drove "while under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor,
of safely driving a vehicle.

11

11

and while

11

incapable

After reviewing the fact tti:·

his blood registered .28% alcohol content (3.5 times the
level for statutory presumption of intoxication)

(T. 90 vo:

that he ran a red light (T. 34-35, 42, 65 Vol. II); that
he struck the victim while the victim was crossing in a
pedestrian crosswalk (T. 65 Vol. II); and that he did not
even swerve to avoid the accident or stop to render assist'
(T. 46 Vol. II), the jury determined that the appellant
drove his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol W
a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.
Implicit in this conclusion and the facts supporting it is
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the notion that in such a situation the actor "ought to
be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that •
the result would occur," and that such conduct is a "gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise . . . "

See definition of criminal negligence

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4)

(1953), as amended.

Therefore,

even though a criminal negligence charge was not given to
the jury, the facts of the case clearly show that criminal
negligence was present.

Consequentl~

the absence of a

criminal negligence instruction did not significantly
impair the fact-finding process in this case.
Under the Stovall, supra, test, the probability
of degree to which the fact finding process might be impaired,
by prospectively applying the new rule, must be weighed
against the amount of reliance on the prior rule, and the
burden retroactive application of the old rule would impose
on the administration of justice.
The appellant was arrested in July of 1977, and
convicted in November of that year for the crime of automobile
homicide.

The trial judge relied on the rulings of this

court in State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (1977) and State v.
Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (1977) which held that in automobile
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homicide cases only a simple negligence instruction was
required.

At the time the instant case was tried, the

reversal this Court would make in State v. Chavez,
P. 2d

No. 16132 (Utah 1980) was totally unforeseeable.

In fact, 17 days after the appellant was convicted, thls
court, in State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398 (Utah 1977) held
that a criminal negligence instruction was not required
in an automobile homicide case for a third time in one
year.
In Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 778 (1972) the
United States Supreme Court determined that the right to
counsel in a preliminary hearing should not be applied
retroactively.

In considering the reliance on the prior

rule the Court stated:
We do not think that law enforcement officials are to be faulted for
not anticipating Coleman. There was
no clear foreshadowing of that rule.
A contrary inference was not unreasonable in light of our decision in
Hamilton v. Alabama.
Id. at 284.
The same reasoning applies to the facts of t~
instant case.

The trial judge's reliance was made in~~

faith, and according to firmly established rulings of this
court.

There is no reasonable expectation that the judge

should have anticipated the reversal this Court made ~
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Chavez, supra, by requiring that a criminal negligence
instruction be given to the jury.
Finally, the retroactive application of Chavez, .
supra, would have a burdensome impact on the administration
of justice.

All of the automobile homicide convictions

since 1973 would suddenly lose their finality.

Determining

the amount of prejudice resulting in each case would be
extremely difficult, and many cases might require retrials.
This burden would be magnified by the fact that in many of
the cases, important pieces of evidence may have been
lost, key witnesses may no longer be available, and even
if they are available, crucial facts will have faded with
time.
In view of the above, the retroactive application of Chavez,
supra, would result not only in an increased burden on
the administration of justice, but possibly in the release
of several convicted felons simply because the trial judges
relied on the court's established and reaffirmed interpretation of the automobile homicide statute.

Such a result

is inequitable and contrary to public policy.
Respondent submits that when the impact the
prospective application of Chavez, supra, would have on the
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administration of justice, the greater equities are
served by limiting the new rule to prospective application
Indeed, this is a case where "the unusual force of the
countervailing considerations strengthens [the] conclusion
in favor of prospective application."
388 U.S. 293,

299

Stovall v. Denno,

(1971).

·Assuming arguendo, that the Chavez, supra, holdi:.
should be retroactively applied the decision of the lower
court should not be reversed and remanded, because it did
not involve prejudicial error.
Utah Code Ann. §77-42-1 (1953), as amended, statl
Judgment to disregard errors not
affecting rights of parties.
~After
hearing an appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
If
error has been committed, it shall
not be presumed to have resulted in
prejudice.
The court must be satisfied that it has that effect before
it is warranted in reversing the
judgment.
Accordingly prejudicial error is not presumed.

The court

must be persuaded of the prejudicial effect of an error.
The standard appropriate in determining preju~~
error is "whether the record discloses error of sufficie~
gravity to indicate substantial prejudice to the defendant!
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rights."

This test requires that a "reasonable probability

of a more favorable result, for defendant, in the absence
of such error, must exist."

State v. Gaxiola, 550 P. 2d 1298

1303 (Utah 1976), see also Willard M. Milne Inv. Co. v. cox,
580 P.2d 607

(Utah 1978), State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d

202, 468 P.2d 639

(1970), Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.

250 (1969).
The record in the instant case does not disclose
"error of substantial gravity to indicate substantial
prejudice to the defendant's rights," not does it support
a reasonable probability that on retrial a different result
would obtain if a criminal negligence instruction were
substituted for the simple negligence charge.
Appellant's proposed instruction No. 7 (R.93)
defined criminal negligence in the language of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-103 (4)

(1953), as amended, which states:

(4)
With criminal negligence or
is criminally negligent with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that the failure
to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would excercise in all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
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The fact that appellant drove his vehicle
through a red light; that his blood registered .28%
alcohol content; that he struck and killed a boy who was.
walking in a pedestrian crosswalk; and that he did not
swerve to avoid the accident, or stop to render assistance
constitutes a "gross deviation" from the standard of care
expected of a reasonable person.

Given the facts of this,

there is simply not a reasonable probability that a jury
could find other than that the appellant "ought" to have
been aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk of
his driving while intoxicated and incapable of driving
safely, and running a red light.
consequently, the judgment of the trial court
should not be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, respondent
submits that the conviction and sentence should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DO RIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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